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EDWIN E. WrrrEt
EVEN more than most legally created institutions, unemployment
compensation as it now exists in the United States is an historical prod-
uct rather than a logical conception. The enactment of the original laws
was the result of many compromises. Since then they have been
changed frequently and in many respects without following any set
patterns. There never has been agreement as to the purpose of un-
employment compensation or its basic principles. Differences of opin-
ion among the champions of the institution are so extreme as to disrupt
lifelong friendships and to provoke more heat than light in discussions.
Unemployment compensation differs so much from state to state that
there is a large element of truth in the claim that there is no such thing
as an American unemployment compensation system. It is not now and
never has been entirely satisfactory to any of the specialists in this field
nor to any element in our complex society. Even during a period of
rising employment, its limitations and inadequacies have become very
apparent. Very certainly, it will not protect us from another depression
nor afford an adequate safeguard against its worst consequences.
Yet unemployment compensation has not proved a failure. After
twenty years of discussion before the first state enacted an unemploy-
ment compensation law and three more years before the second law was
passed, the next two years witnessed enactment of such legislation in
literally every state. Since then eight years have elapsed, during which
unemployment compensation has been improved in many respects.
Benefits have been very distinctly liberalized and, while still inade-
quate, are mucl better than the actuaries considered to be within the
realm of possibility when the laws were enacted. Much larger reserves
have been accumulated than were expected. Both these results are
primarily attributable to very favorable employment conditions, but
are likely to prove of greatest value now that the war has ended and
we are confronted with reconversion unemployment. While there has
been much distrust and a great deal of friction between the state and
federal officials concerned with unemployment compensation, its ad-
ministration has been quite satisfactory and not very costly. Unem-
ployment compensation has truly become an accepted part of the
American way of life, and all discussion of it nowadays concerns its
improvement, not whether it should be retained. Yet it is, by no
means, a finished institution, but one which is likely to continue to
undergo many changes and which clearly still needs to be improved to
realize its fullest possibilities.
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ENACTMENT OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS
The American unemployment compensation laws stemmed from two
major sources: the American workmen's compensation system and the
British unemployment insurance system. The most novel feature of
the American system of unemployment compensation (federal-state
administration), however, was introduced through the Social Security
Act of 1935. The provisions in that act relating to unemployment com-
pensation were designed to induce the states to enact such legislation,
after years of failure to get them to do so. This purpose was accom-
plished in a remarkably short time, but the provisions remained as a
method of administration. This aspect of the legislation, lightly con-
sidered at the time, has powerfully affected all subsequent develop-
ments, as have: the controversies between the advocates of unemploy-
ment compensation which developed during the years when they were
debating the institution in a vacuum, in the absence of actual experi-
ence.
Earliest Discussions of Unemployment Insurance.1 There was some
discussion of unemployment insurance in the United States even before
Great Britain passed its pioneer national act in 1911, under the leader-
ship of the American Association for Labor Legislation. At its First
Annual Meeting in 1907, Professor Henry R. Seager of Columbia Uni-
versity discussed the "Ghent system" of unemployment insurance. At
its Fifth Annual Meeting in 1911, Professor Charles R. Henderson of
the University of Chicago discussed the recently enacted British law,
and the Association organized a Committee on Unemployment to study
the problem and to consider methods of prevention and alleviation.
In 1913, the Association sponsored the first American Conference on
Social Insurance, at which Professor Henderson, in a paper on "Insur-
ance Against Unemployment," strongly urged that such insurance
was a necessity for this country, no less than in the older countries of
Europe.
Much more extensive interest in unemployment insurance developed
during the depression of 1914-1915. In February 1914, the American
Association for Labor Legislation and the affiliated American Associa-
tion on Unemployment conducted a National Conference on Unem-
ployment and followed this up by a second conference in December.
At this Second National Conference on Unemployment a tentative
draft of "A Practical Program for the Prevention of Unemployment
1. Growth of the Job Insurance Program-An Evoltionary Development (1933) 23 AM.
LAB. LEG. REv. 146 is an excellent brief account of the development of interest in unemploy-
ment insurance in this country and of the efforts to get unemployment insurance laws on the
statute books down to date of its publication. Numerous other articles published in practi-
cally every issue of the American Labor Legislation Review serve as the best source for tracing
the development of unemployment insurance in the United States prior to the passage of
the Social Security Act.
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in America" was presented and endorsed.2 This called for a nation-
wide and coordinated system of public employment offices, planned
public works programs and the expansion of public construction in
periods of depression, the regularization of industry, and unemploy-
ment insurance. While the major function of unemployment insurance
was conceived to be to stimulate the prevention of unemployment, it
was also to serve "for the maintenance, through out-of-work benefits,
of those reserves of labor which may still be necessary to meet the un-
precedented fluctuations of industry." This program was supported by
many of the emergency commissions created throughout the country
during the depression of 1914-1915 and also by many big-name re-
formers. As far as unemployment insurance is concerned, however, it
led to but one legislative proposal, the Massachusetts bill of 1916,
which was almost a copy of the original British law except that it ap-
plied to a wider range of industries.3 By the time this bill was intro-
duced, boom had succeeded depression, and it received scant considera-
tion. In the succeeding years, even the American Association for Labor
Legislation seems for a time to have lost interest in unemployment
insurance. In 1916, however, the Dennison Manufacturing Company
pioneered with the first company unemployment reserve system, to be
followed in the twenties by quite a few more company plans and somejoint company-union unemployment reserve systems.4 These were
indications that American opinion was gradually coming to recognize
not only that unemployment is a problem of industry and not merely of
unwillingness to work, but also that something can be done about it.
But all progressive thought on the subject regarded the regularization
of industry and the prevention of unemployment, rather than the alle-
viation of its consequences, as the objective.
The Huber Bil. in Wisconsin. Although Americans became increas-
ingly conscious of the problems of unemployment during the short but
very severe depression of 1920-1921, for the most part they turned to
remedies other than unemployment insurance. The keynote was
sounded in the opening statements of President Harding and Secretary
of Commerce Hoover to the President's Conference on Unemployment
of 1921, warning the members to avoid "the demoralizing experience of
Europe" or seeking the remedy "in doles from the public treasury." 3
2. This draft was first published in 1915. 5 A!,.. LAB. LEG. Rsv. 173. Its principal
author was Dr. John B. Andrews, Executive Secretary of the American Association for Labor
Legislation, to whom also goes the credit for the leadership of this organization for many
years in the promotion of unemployment insurance in this country.
3. Social Insurance Urged in Massachuselts (1916) 37 THE SutR v 207.
4. The most comprehensive account of the voluntary unemployment insurance ex-
periments which preceded the first compulsory act is BRYcE M. STrvIAET, U: ELOVIMA:;r
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (1930). See also Brown, Company Plansfor Uncrnp!oyrxcv.1
Compensation (1933) 23 ArN. LAB. LEG. REv. 176.
5. REPORT OF THE PRnsmENT's Co.NEEaNCE O-N UNEA.PLOY!.ENT (1921) 25, 23.
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Unemployment insurance, however, was more widely discussed than
ever before, and in Wisconsin a new proposal for unemployment insur-
ance made its appearance. This was the Huber Bill of 1921, whose real
author was the late Professor John R. Commons.' Ten years before,
Professor Commons had been one of the first workmen's compensation
administrators in this country and had been very much impressed by
the stimulus which the workmen's compensation laws had afforded to
the safety-first movement. He believed that if employers were required
to pay a substantial part of the costs of unemployment they would find
means of greatly reducing unemployment, just as industrial accidents
had been reduced after passage of the workmen's compensation laws.
To effectuate this purpose, the Huber bill deviated quite considerably
from unemployment insurance as it had developed in England, and
was distinctly a blend of workmen's compensation and unemployment
insurance. This was reflected in the very name given the institution,
"unemployment compensation." Unlike the British Act, it provided
for contributions from the employers only and for variations in contri-
bution rates. In the terminology of the later controversy over pooled
funds versus employer reserves, it provided for a pooled fund but with
the contribution rates varying in accordance with the risk of the indus-
try to which a firm belonged and its own employment record.
This measure, at the time, had a broader appeal than the British act
or the Massachusetts bill of 1916. It came within one vote of passage
when first introduced. Thereafter it was reintroduced in every succeed-
ing session of the Wisconsin Legislature in the 1920's, and, although it
never again came as close to passage, it always commanded respectable
support. It was copied during the same period in many other states,
where it received endorsements from many sources. While the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor adhered to its official position (adopted in
1916) of opposition to unemployment insurance in any form, the Wis-
consin and many other state federations of labor actively supported
the Commons proposal, as did the progressive employers who were
experimenting with unemployment reserves of their own and literally
everybody who at that time was advocating unemployment insurance
in this country. Until the great depression began in the fall of 1929,
the support for unemployment insurance, however, was too small for
passage of any legislation on the subject.
Throughout the twenties, the British unemployment insurance sys-
tem was in low repute in the United States. In popular discussions it
was usually referred to as a "dole," and the fact that England appeared
6. The author, as Chief of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Service, was in close
touch with all developments in relation to unemployment insurance in Wisconsin, from the
time of the introduction of the Huber bill pntil the Wisconsin law came into operation.
For the text of the Huber bill see ALLEN BENNETT FORSBERG, SELECTED ARTICLES Ow-
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (1926) 124-7.
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to be less prosperous than the United States was ascribed to its mis-
taken policy of governmental coddling of the unemployed. Under the
circumstances, it was but natural that the champions of unemploy-
ment insurance insisted that their proposal was an ".American plan,"
radically different from the defective British system. Nor did unem-
ployment insurance as it existed in England become immediately popu-
lar after the great depression set in; for the early years of the depres-
sion witnessed the near collapse of the British system, and it was not
until a considerable time after it had passed the crisis in 1931 that its
basic strength was appreciated in this country.
Interest and Progress in the Early Depression Years. The idea that
there should be unemployment reserves to tide the workers over periods
of depression, akin to the corporate reserves from which corporations
were able to keep up dividend payments although operating in the
red gained, however, great popularity. Business leaders who looked
with favor upon this idea wanted each corporation or trade association
to set up and control its own unemployment reserves, with the govern-
ment doing no more than to exempt from taxation funds set aside for
this purpose. The people who had long urged unemployment insurance
sought to capitalize upon the growing popularity of unemployment
reserves in the ranks of business. The result was a further emphasis
upon the features which distinguished the American proposals from
their British prototype. In 1930 the American Association for Labor
Legislation promulgated "An American Plan for Unemployment Re-
serves," 7 and a new unemployment compensation bill (named for its
introducer, Professor Harold M. Groves, and drafted by students of
Professor Commons, particularly Elizabeth Brandeis and her husband
Paul Rauschenbush) made its appearance in Wisconsin.8 These meas-
ures were very similar to the Huber bill but provided for segregating
each employer's contributions in a separate account within the state's
unemployment reserve fund, to which all payments of benefits to his
employees were to be charged. Unlike a true employer reserve, moneys
in this account did not belong to the employer, and the entire fund was
pooled for purposes of investment and management; but it was stresed
that this sort of a system made each employer responsible only for his
own unemployment and afforded the possibility of keeping his costs
at a minimum.
Even with the vigorous support of the state administration of Gov-
ernor Philip F. LaFollette, however, it was not possible to get the nec-
essary votes for passage of the Groves bill until its supporters accepted
7. For the tex:t see Senate Passes Unemp!nVrent Bills (1930) 20 .A. LAB. LEG. Rnv.
125. A revised draft of this American Plan was issued by the As2ociation in 1933: An Awmeri-
can Plan for Unemployment Reserve Funds (1933) 23 Am. LAB. LEG. REv. 79.
8. Wisconsin Assembly Bill 225 A. On this bill see Groves, Program for UrCMp!o:,aent
Reserve Funds in IWisconsin (1931) 21 A-u. LAB. LEGIS. REv. 55.
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two amendments offered by its opponents. One of these provided that
the state scheme should not take effect if a sufficient number of em-
ployers voluntarily set up unemployment reserves of their own during
the period of a year and a half before the law's effective date. The other
allowed employers with unemployment reserve systems providing as
liberal benefits as the state system to retain their reserves and manage
their own systems. It was in this form that Wisconsin in February 1932
enacted the first American unemployment insurance law,' to become
effective, as far as the collection of contributions was concerned, on
July 1, 1933 (unless a sufficient number of employers in the meantime
established employment reserve funds of their own), with benefit pay-
ments to begin two years later.
When Wisconsin enacted its pioneer law, there was a rapidly growing
interest in unemployment insurance throughout the country. The na-
tional administration manifested no interest in the subject, but it at-
tracted ever-increasing attention in the states. It was discussed for the
first time at the Conference of Governors in June 1930. On that occa-
sion Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York said, in his first
statement on the subject, "Unemployment insurance we shall come to
in this country just as certainly as we came to workmen's compensa-
tion." 10 The platform on which he was re-elected in November pledged
a thorough study of the subject. In the ensuing legislative session a
serious attempt was made to pass a bill embodying the American Plan
for Unemployment Reserves of the American Association for Labor
Legislation, which had the endorsement of Frances Perkins, then the
State Commissioner of Labor. This was not successful, but a state
commission was organized to study unemployment insurance." In six-
teen other states, unemployment insurance bills made their appear-
ance, and no less than 23 such bills were introduced in the legislative
sessions of 1931.12 Nowhere did these bills get through even one house,
but six states created legislative commissions to study unemployment
insurance and a select committee for the same purpose was organized
by the United States Senate. 13 Several more such commissions were
9. Wis. Laws 1931, c. 20, Spec. Sess. 1931, Wis. STAT. (1943) §§ 108.01-26. For an
authoritative discussion of this measure, see Rauschenbush, Wisconsin's Unemployment
Compensation Act (1932) 22 Amx. LAB. LEG. REv. 11.
10. Roosevelt on Unemployment Insurance (1931) 21 Am!. LAB. LEG. RaV. 219.
11. On the developments in New York in 1931 relating to unemployment insurance see
Unemployment Reserve Fund Bill Introduced in New York (1931) 21 Am. LAu. LEG. Rv. 61;
Complacency of Labor Creates Crisis, id. at 204; New York Legislature Resolves to Study Un-
employment, id. at 208; Roosevelt on Unemployment Insurance, id. at 219.
12. Unerployment Insurance Legislation (1931) 21 Am. LAB. LEG. REV. 332.
13. The earliest proposal for unemployment insurance presented in Congress was a bill
by Representative Meyer London (New York Socialist) in 1916. In 1928, the Senate adopted
a resolution by Senator Couzens (Michigan) for a'study of unemployment insurance by the
Committee on Education and Labor. That committee, after brief hearings before a sub-
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organized by governors in 1931 and 1932. In 1931 there also was or-
ganized, at the suggestion of Governor Roosevelt, an Interstate Com-
mission on Unemployment, constituted of the representatives of the
governors of seven northeastern states. This Interstate Commission,
reporting in 1932, urged immediate legislation to establish unemploy-
ment reserves. 14 Recommendations for the enactment of unemploy-
ment insurance laws were also made by the study commissions of six
states. The most important development in this year, however, was
that unemployment compensation became a practical political ques-
tion. At its annual convention, the American Federation now came out
for unemployment insurance, stressing in its resolution that the legisla-
tion should be designed to stimulate the prevention of unemployment.5
Still more important was the promise by the Democratic national plat-
form of "unemployment insurance through state action" and the elec-
tion, on that platform, of Franklin D. Roosevelt and a large party
majority in both houses of Congress.
Failure of Efforts at State Legislation in z933. In view of these de-
velopments, there appeared to be at the beginning of 1933 every pros-
pect that many states would enact unemployment insurance laws in
the legislative sessions then convening. A total of 6S bills were intro-
duced in 25 states, and Senator Wagner introduced in Congress an
unemployment reserves bill for the District of Columbia.", In seven
states one house passed an unemployment insurance bill, but nowhere
was such a bill enacted into law; and in Wisconsin repeal of the law
enacted in the previous year -as avoided only by the acceptance of its
supporters of postponement of the effective date for another yearY
By the end of the year, hope for the establishment of unemployment
insurance in this country through unaided state action seemed remote.
One factor accounting for this situation was division of opinion
among the advocates of unemployment insurance; another, that with
the continuance of wholesale unemployment, unemployment insurance
and particularly unemployment reserves seemed less valuable than
committee, reported that compulsory legislation w.as premature but recommended the vol-
untary establishment of unemployment reserves by employers. SEN. R p. No. 2072, 70th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1928).
The select committee created in 1931 consisted of Senators Hebert, Glenn, and Wagner.
This committee made a report generally favorable to unemployment insurance, but con-
eluded that the only thing the national government could do on the subject was to allow
credit in the administration of the federal income for payments made into unemployment
reserve funds. SEe. REP. No. 964, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
14. Governors' Interstate Commission Urges Unemployment Reserres (1932) 22 A .LAB.
LEG. RFV. 19.
15. Trafton, America Moves Toward Compulsory Unemp!oymenl Rescrres (1932) 22 Ans.
LAB. LEG. REv. 125, 133; ArmERmcA. FEDEWITION OF LABOR PROCEEDI GS (1932) 39, 340.
16. See Unemploynent Insurance Bills Introducrd in 1933 (1933) 23 Am. LAB. LrO.
REv. 73.
17. Wis. Laws 1933, c. 186.
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earlier in the depression. Controversy developed with the passage of
the Wisconsin law and the filing, late in 1932, of the report of the Ohio
state commission for the study of unemployment insurance. 18 In this
report a strong stand was taken against individual employer reserves,
and a plan of unemployment compensation was recommended which
closely resembled the original Huber bill. The controversy which de-
veloped at first concerned the Wisconsin law versus the Ohio plan, but
soon shifted to a more general debate over employer reserves versus
pooled funds, the advisability of variations in contribution rates, em-
ployer versus tri-party financing, and the purposes of unemployment
insurance. Two camps developed, with one or the other of which nearly
all of the intellectuals interested in unemployment compensation were
identified-the one composed of most of the early advocates of unem-
ployment insurance connected with the American Association for
Labor Legislation, the other centering in the American Association for
Social Security, which until 1933 was the Association for Old Age Se-
curity but which with its change in name became the great champion
of a British unemployment insurance system for the United States.
This controversy gave the general public the impression that these
advocates did not know what they wanted. At least of equal impor-
tance in stalling progress was that the continuance of the depression
made it impossible to see the solution of the unemployment problem in
unemployment insurance. While employer unemployment reserves
seemed very promising early in the depression, they had by this time
been conclusively demonstrated to be inadequate. The great increase
in popular support for unemployment insurance in the years 1931-1933
came primarily from those who were experiencing or feared the inade-
quacies and hardships of relief, but the size of the problem and its long
continuance made it very clear that unemployment insurance at its
best was only a partial solution.
But a far more important obstacle to attaining unemployment in-
surance through state action was the argument that any state which
enacted an unemployment compensation law thereby handicapped its
employers in interstate markets by burdening them with costs their
competitors in other states were not required to meet." It was this
argument which everywhere defeated the unemployment insurance
bills despite their endorsements, and which came very close to bringing
about the repeal of the one law which had been put upon the statute
books.
Wagner-Lewis Bill, 1934. This situation naturally led the advocates
of unemployment insurance to turn to the national government, par-
18. Dr. I. M. Rubinow and Dr. William M. Leiserson, both advocates of unemploy-
ment insurance of long standing were the leading members of this commission.
19. On this point read the testimony of Dr. I. M. Rubinow in Hearings before Con-
mittee on Ways and Means on H. R. 7659, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 187, 190.
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ticularly as it was then demonstrating in its New Deal program its
sympathy for the forgotten man and its willingness to experiment.5
Scarcely anyone then believed that the national government under our
Constitution could itself establish a system of unemployment insur-
ance, so federal legislation was sought which would induce the states to
enact unemployment compensation laws. The first such proposal was
Senator Wagner's bill of March 1933 to allow employers to deduct from
their federal income taxes a part of their contributions to state unem-
ployment compensation reserve funds.2' A year later, in February 1934,
Senator Wagner and Representative Leuis presented a radically differ-
ent proposal to accomplish the same purpose. This Wagner-Lewis bill 22
was drafted in the Department of Labor but is believed to have been
suggested by the late Justice Louis D. Brandeis. It proposed the levy
of a federal tax upon employers throughout the country against which
they might offset their contributions paid to state unemployment com-
pensation funds. This measure was approved by President Roosevelt
and, in extended hearings by a subcommittee of the House Ways and
Means Committee, was endorsed by Secretary of Labor Perkins, by
leading representatives of both groups among the advocates of unem-
ployment insurance,2 3 by President Green of the American Federation
of Labor, and by an impressive list of progressive employers. Yet it
was never reported upon, and in May it was announced from the White
House that the Administration would not press for a vote in that ses-
sion but that the President would soon present a comprehensive pro-
gram for social insurance, including unemployment insurance. This
was followed by the President's social insurance message of June 3,
1934, in which he announced his intention to present a comprehensive
social insurance bill to the incoming Congress the next January and his
organization of a Committee on Economic Security to study the entire
subject and to prepare the legislation which the Administration would
recommend.
2 4
Preparation of tie Social Security Act. The Committee on Economic
Security consisted of five members of the Cabinet, with Secretary
Perkins as the chairman, the author of this article as its executive
director, and Thomas E. Eliot as its counsel. The Committee em-
ployed a small staff of "experts" and was flanked by a large group of
20. For a more detailed account of the development of the titles in the Social Security
Act of 1935 relating to unemployment compensation than is here given Eee Witte, An His-
torical Account of Unemployment Insurance in the Social Security Act (1936) 3 LAw - Conr-
TMP. PROB. 157-69.
21. S. J. Res. 26, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
22. H. R. 7659, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
23. Among these were Dr. I. M. Rubinow, Paul Douglas, Abraham Epstein, and
John B. Andrews.
24. H. R. Doc. No. 397, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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advisory committees, the most important of which was the Technical
Committee on Economic Security, whose chairman was Arthur J.
Altmeyer, then Assistant Secretary of Labor, and whose members were
all selected from the government service on the basis of their special
knowledge of some aspect of social security.
Unemployment insurance was the form of social security of greatest
interest to a majority of all people connected with the Committee on
Economic Security. The subject provoked the most extended discus-
sions and the widest differences of opinion. To add to the old contro-
versies of the immediately preceding years, wide differences developed
over the degree of control the national government should exercise over
unemployment compensation. The Subcommittee on Unemployment
Insurance 21 of the Technical Committee on Economic Security at one
of its first meetings decided that it would recommend a federal system
of unemployment insurance, rather than legislation like the Wagner-
Lewis bill. It made a very genuine attempt to carry out this resolution,
but its members could never agree upon the provisions of the federal
system of unemployment insurance to be recommended, and it wound
up by unanimously recommending a federal-state system of unemploy-
ment compensation to be inaugurated through legislation like the'
Wagner-Lewis bill. That was also the unanimous recommendation of
the Committee on Economic Security in its report presented infor-
mally to the President on Christmas Day 1934 and in final form before
the middle of January 1935.6
By that time the Committee had ready for introduction in Congress
a draft bill, which was discussed in advance with Congressional sup-
porters of the Administration, particularly the leading members of the
two committees to which this bill would be referred-the House Ways
and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. All these
members of Congress were agreed that the federal-state approach was
the only one that could be considered and that the Wagner-Lewis bill
was the most promising approach, both from the point of view of gain-
ing approval from the Supreme Court in the inevitable test of constitu-
tionality which would follow enactment of the law and to win the nec-
essary cooperation of the states. Some of the staff members of the
Committee on Economic Security and some consultants of the Com-
mittee refused to accept this decision and throughout the months of the
Congressional consideration of the Social Security Act criticized and
opposed the Administration's program. In relation to unemployment
25. The Chairman of this subcommittee was Dr. Alvin H. Hansen. Other members
were Dr. William M. Leiserson, Thomas H. Eliot, Dr. Jacob Viner, and E. Willard Jensen.
26. Published separately as H. R. Doc. No. 81; in 79 CONG. REC. 545-9; and in Hearings
before Committee on Finance on S. 1130, Economic Security Act (rev. ed.), pp. 1131-51, and
Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 4120, Economic Security Act, pp.
19-59, all 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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compensation they advocated what they called a "subsidy system,"
which differed from the Wagner-Lewis proposal in providing for the
collection of all unemployment insurance taxes by the national govern-
ment, return to each state of the taxes collected from its citizens, and
the imposition of many standards to be observed by the states to get
this money.
27
Congressional Consideration. The President presented the report of
the Committee on Economic Security to the Congress on January 17,
1935, with the recommendation that it enact the legislation recom-
mended by the Committee. He urged that action be taken without
delay, because most of the state legislatures, which would also have to
act to put the program into effect, were then in session. The Wagner-
Doughton bill 2s was introduced immediately after the President's
message, and hearings on the measure were begun ithin a few days
in both houses. But it was not until August that the Social Security
Act became law. The reasons for this long delay lie outside of the scope
of this article, as they were not related to unemployment compensa-
tion. Suffice it to express my belief (based upon the closest daily con-
tact with every development during these months) that but for the
efforts of Secretary Perkins and her assistants, and, above all, the in-
sistence of President Roosevelt and the loyal support he received from
the leaders of the congressional committees having this legislation in
charge, the Social Security Act would not have become law even
though on the final vote the measure passed both houses by large
majorities. It is also my conviction that, if this law had not been
enacted at the time., no legislation on the subject could have been gotten
through Congress in the next five or six years.
Unlike the people connected with the Committee on Economic Se-
curity, the great majority of the members of Congress were little in-
terested in unemployment compensation and there was at the time no
very great popular demand for any legislation on the subject. Unem-
ployment compensation was, indeed, discussed by many of the wit-
nesses before the congressional committees, most of them being critical
of the Administration's proposals. Fully worked out substitutes pro-
viding, respectively, for a federal system of unemployment insurance
and for the "subsidy" plan were presented to the committees, but re-
ceived no support whatsoever. The members of Congress throughout
27. The "subsidy system" proposed differed from the normal federal grant-in-aid in
that it did not contemplate grants from the federal treasury to the states, but onl. the return
to each state of the taxes collected for unemployment compensation purpozse from its em-
ployers, subject to its compliance vdth standards prescribed in tile federal act. It, thus,
would not have given the states any aid whatsoever, but would have made it virtually
obligatory for them to observe the standards for unemployment compensation prezcribed
by the national government.
28. S. 1130 and H. R. 4120, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
took it for granted that if anything was to be done about unemploy-
ment insurance, the Administration's proposals would have to be
approved. While other parts of the bill were radically changed by the
congressional committees, the provisions on unemployment compensa-
tion became law almost exactly as introduced."0
Unemployment Compensation in the Social Security Act. The Social
Security Act contemplated a "federal-state" system of unemployment
compensation. The states were to enact and administer the actual
unemployment compensation laws and were to collect the unemploy-
ment compensation-funds, which, however, were required to be de-
posited in the United States Treasury and invested in United States
securities. The role assigned to the national government was prin-
cipally that of inducing the states to pass unemployment compensation
laws. To this end the Social Security Act imposed an excise tax of 3
percent upon the payrolls of all employers of eight or more (with stated
exceptions) against which, however, they could offset their payments
to state unemployment compensation funds up to 90 percent of the
total tax. In addition, the Act authorized an appropriation for aid to
the states for the administration of their laws. No conditions of any
great moment had to be met to entitle a state law to recognition for
tax-offset purposes, other than that all of the unemployment compen-
sation funds had to be actually used for payments to unemployed
workers; however, the condition was prescribed that the administra-
tion of the state law must be satisfactory to the Social Security Board
to entitle a state to a share in the federal aid for administration. The
Social Security Board was given authority to pass upon whether a state
law qualified for the tax offset and to allot the moneys appropriated for
the administration of the state laws, and it was charged with making
continuous studies of all forms of social security, with a view to im-
proving the protection afforded. No other specific duties in relation to
unemployment compensation were imposed on the Board, although
the inference may be drawn from the Act that it should give assistance
to the state authorities in the passage of the necessary state legislation
and on problems as to which they might seek aid. The truth is that the
entire plan was developed as an expedient to get the states to enact
unemployment compensation laws, with but little thought as to how
the plan would work out once this primary purpose was realized.30
29. 49 STAT. 620 (1935), 42 U. S. C. § 301 (1940). At one stage, the House Ways and
Means Committee adopted an amendment which would have eliminated the extra credit in
the tax offset provisions when states have reduced the contribution rates after their reserve
funds had attained a size sufficient to warrant such action. This, however, is best described
as an accidental occurrence and did not reflect any dissatisfaction with the Adininistra.
tion's proposals. The eliminated provisions were restored without objection.
30. In the order of passage of their unemployment compensation acts these states were
Washington, Utah, New York, New Hampshire, California, Massachusetts, and Alabama.
The Social Security Board refused to approve the original Utah law and it passed a second
act (which was approved) in 1936.
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E-nactment of the State Unemployment Compensation Laws. Passage
of the Social Security Act did not result in the immediate enactment of
laws in all the states. For more than a year progress was distressingly
slow. By the time the Social Security Act had been passed the 1935
sessions of the state legislatures had adjourned, and the next regular
session in most states did not convene until January 1937. Even more
important was uncertainty as to whether the federal legislation would
endure. Congress had adjourned shortly after passage of the Act
without making any appropriation to carry out its provisions (there
was no opposition to the appropriation but it failed of passage because
of a filibuster staged by Senator Huey Long for reasons which had
nothing to do with the Social Security Act). In consequence, the Social
Security Board did not begin functioning until October 1935, and had
to get along -with a small borrowed staff until Congress appropriated
funds after reconvening in January 1936. And there was still grave
doubt whether the legislation would be held constitutional. As the
presidential election of that year approached, the future of the Social
Security Act seemed ever to become more uncertain. It was not until
after the reelection of President Roosevelt by an overwhelming ma-
jority that the tide -as really turned.
While the Social Security Act wras still before Congress, the Com-
mittee on Economic Security prepared several drafts of model state
unemployment compensation bills. Six states actually passed state
laws before the Social Security Act became law and another did so
within a month thereafter, during which Congress also enacted an
unemployment compensation law for the District of Columbia. Then
followed a period of six months in which but one additional law -' was
passed-and that a measure drafted before the Social Security Act
became law. Only six additional states 32 enacted unemployment com-
pensation laws before the election, plus which one more state enacted
a new law because the Social Security Board would not approve its
original act.
In the six weeks following the reelection of President Roosevelt
nearly all the remaining states passed laws. The Social Security Act
provided that the 3 percent tax on employers was to apply to the pay-
rolls of the year 1936 and that only payments made to state unemploy-
ment compensation funds prior to January 1, 1937 would be credited
as an offset against this tax. The governors of state after state now
convened their legislatures in special sessions "to come under the wire,"
and these sessions enacted unemployment compensation laws without
giving any real consideration to their provisions. To make sure of the
approval of the Social Security Board they used the model "pooled
31. Oregon.
32. Indiana, Mississippi, Rhode Island, Louisiana, South Carolina, Idaho.
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fund" state bill drafted by the Board, which its staff plainly preferred
to the model state "employer reserves" (really "employer account")
bill which the Board also distributed. By the close of the year 1936 all
but two states 13 had passed unemployment compensation acts and
these two states did so within the next six months.
In May 1937, the Supreme Court of the United States held consti-
tutional both the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social
Security Act and the state unemployment compensation laws 14 on
such broad grounds that it appears that almost any ldnd of an unem-
ployment insurance system would have been sustained, including one
operated exclvsively by the federal government. Yet until shortly
before these decisions were handed down, there was grave doubt
whether unemployment compensation would be found constitutional.
A committee of the American Bar Association, composed of eminent
members of the Bar, reporting in 1936,11 declared the entire legislation
to be unconstitutional; and several of the lower federal courts took the
same view.
So it came to pass that in less than two years after the Act was
enacted unemployment compensation was securely established every-
where in the United States, and contributions for unemployment com-
pensation purposes were being collected in all states. In accordance
with their terms, benefits under these laws were not payable until two
years after collection began, but by January 1939 unemployment com-
pensation benefits were being paid in all states. Each of the 51 "state"
(48 states, two territories, and the District of Columbia) laws had some
provisions different from every other law, but all had far more simi-
larities than differences. Most of the differences, indeed, were attrib-
utable to changes in the successive drafts of the model bills which the
Committee on Economic Security and the Social Security Board rec-
ommended during the period in which the state laws were being en-
acted, for not above a half dozen states passed their laws without
definite assistance from these federal agencies and all of these early in
the game.
PROGRESS SINCE ENACTMENT OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION LAWS
Administration of Unemployment Compensation."6 Once the state
33. These were Missouri and Illinois. Congress subsequently amended the Social Se-
curity Act to allow the full offset to the employers in these laggard states, as if they had their
unemployment compensation acts in effect on January 1, 1937.
34. Steward Machinery Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937).
35. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAW (published in Advance Program of 59th Annual
Meeting, 1936).
36. The account of the difficulties met with and the progress made in the administration
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laws had been enacted, unemployment compensation became a matter
of administration. On this vital subject the provisions of the Social
Security Act were scanty. As has been noted, the Act created the
Social Security Board, with responsibility for the performance of most
of the functions assigned to the national government. As proposed by
the Committee on Economic Security, the Board was to be within the
Department of Labor. Congress changed this to make the Social Se-
curity Board an independent agency, but it left the United States
Employment Service 'ithin the Department of Labor. One of the few
provisions with which the states had to comply to secure approval for
their laws under the tax offset provisions of the Social Security Act was
that all payments of unemployment compensation must be made
through the public employment offices, whose connection with the
national government is through the United States Employment Serv-
ice. The allotment of the federal aid for the administration of unem-
ployment compensation, however, was made a function of the Social
Security Board. From the outset the Social Security Board exerted
pressure upon the states to place unemployment compensation and the
public employment offices under a unified administration; but on the
level of the national government the two functions have always been
separated except for a short period before our entrance into the war.
After Pearl Harbor the national government took over the administra-
tion of the public employment offices but made this a function of the
War Manpower Commission, while the federal functions in relation to
unemployment compensation remained with the Social Security Board.
In the early years of the Social Security Act this division of functions
produced conflicts which perplexed the states and to some degree inter-
fered with efficient administration. At all times, however, the principal
agency of the national government concerned with unemployment
compensation has been the Social Security Board.
The Social Security Board throughout its history has been an effi-
cient agency, operated on a strictly non-political basis. Dr. Arthur J.
Altmeyer, its guiding genius, ranks among the top federal administra-
tors and its other members and principal staff executives have been
able, high-grade people. When unemployment compensation started
there were no trained administrators, but the Social Security Board
attracted a goodly percentage of all the people in this country who had
any more than a most superficial knowledge of the subject. In con-
trast, in the states many of the top administrators were political ap-
pointees and the lower prestige and salaries resulted in less promising
staffs.
In the American system, the actual administration of unemployment
of unemployment compensation is based on the author's observations and note3, but has
been checked with many people both in the state and federal administrations.
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compensation is a state function. The Social Security Board has never
paid unemployment compensation to any one nor has it any direct
contacts with claimants. The states collect all the unemployment com-
pensation funds, determine the eligibility of claimants and make all
payments. But the Social Security Board has had a much larger role
in the administration of unemployment compensation than is suggested
by the brief provisions of the Social Security Act. This is a conse-
quence, in part, of the ability and aggressiveness of the staff of the
Board, but above all of the fact that the Social Security Board controls
all of the funds for administration. The Act does not specifically pro-
vide for this control, but it has been thus interpreted from the start.
With the exception of the Wisconsin act, none of the original state laws
made any provisions for financing the administration of unemployment
compensation other than from the federal aid dispensed by the Social
Security Board.3 7 The result is a situation well expressed in the old
adage, "He who pays the piper can call the tune." The Social Security
Board has not hesitated to do so. It has insisted not only upon strict
accounting for all funds it allots, but upon detailed budgets setting
forth the purposes of all expenditures.
On its face, this is not a good arrangement. The states which spend
the money bear no part of the costs, while the Social Security 3oard
sits in judgment upon their acts while bearing no responsibility therefor.
But, while this has led to much senseless bickering, bitter recriminations,
and unfortunate hostilities, the results have not been wholly bad. The
state administration of unemployment compensation is better for the
interference of the Social Security Board, and it is my belief that the
provisions of the unemployment compensation laws are more liberal
today than they would have been by this time under either exclusively
federal or state administration.
Although the Social Security Board exerted a very great influence
on the provisions of the original state unemployment compensation
laws, it was less helpful to the states with their initial problems of ad-
ministration. At this stage many of the states asked the Social Security
Board for assistance, but the Board let the opportunity pass. Instead
of sending its staff people into the states to work the administrators
on their problems, it took the attitude of merely reviewing critically
37. No state other than Wisconsin made any provisions for funds for administration
apart from the federal grants-in-aid until Missouri did so in 1941. Now 17 states, including
Wisconsin and Missouri have such provisions, 13 of these amending their laws to this effect
in 1945. These states all utilize interest earnings and penalties on overdue payments as the
sources of special administrative funds they have created. No state other than Wisconsin
has thus far used any of its own moneys for administration and Wisconsin did so only prior
to the time when its law was approved as complying with the Social Security Act. The 17
states which now have special administrative funds, however, are far less dependent upon
the funds controlled by the Social Security Board than nearly all states have been, until very
recently, in the administration of their unemployment compensation laws.
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the activities of the state administrators. The Social Security Board
gave a very great impetus to good state administration, however, by
its insistence upon keeping out politics and basing the selection and
tenure of all employees in the state administrations on a merit basis.
Congress had expressly amended the Social Security bill in the course
of its passage to deprive the Social Security Board of any control over
the personnel, tenure, or salaries of the people in the state administra-
tions, but the Board courageously interpreted this provision as having
reference only to individuals and not to its insistence upon selection on
a merit basis. The great majority of the states, unlike the national
government, had no civil service systems. The Board met this situation
by requiring the states (as a condition of receiving federal aid for ad-
ministration) to establish special merit systems for employees concerned
with social security services. In doing so, it not only was largely re-
sponsible for the fact that the unemployment compensation adminis-
trations got staffs which while inexperienced were able to learn from
experience, but also gave impetus to the passage of general civil service
laws in a number of states.
Most of the states began the payment of benefits in 193S, a year of a
sharp depression and rapidly increasing unemployment. Preparations
were inadequate, and the state administrations were soon swamped by
the large number of claims which were filed. In some states, including
several of the most important industrial ones, there was a near breal:-
do n in administration, with claims piling up which were not acted
upon for months. Within half a year or so, however, this situation was
straightened out, and in a majority of states no such condition ever
developed. Since this early period there have been few complaints
about delays or mixed-up records. Costs of administration have been
much lower than expected. By this time the administration of unem-
ployment compensation has been standardized and we now have a
large corps of experienced administrators. And we have developed a
strong tradition of non-political administration, although in many
states the top administrators still go in and out with the governors.
Liberalization of Benefits. Great progress has been made in the lib-
eralization of benefits. Literally every state has increased the benefits
payable under its unemployment compensation law.
At the time the states enacted their original laws, the Committee on
Economic Security and the Social Security Board cautioned them to
guard against letting their benefits get too high. In this vein the Social
Security Board said in The Federal-State Program for Uncmplo'ment
Cozpensation,03 issued October 1, 1935 as the first publication in its
State Series: Unemploymnt Compensation,
38. This was issued as a guide to the states in framing their unemployment companza-
tion laws. The quotations are from page 6.
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"It is suggested that the states should be conservative in fixing
the benefit rates at the outset, and establish rates which it is be-
lieved can be paid in full except in a serious depression without ex-
hausting the fund. If these rates prove to be lower than necessary
they can be increased after the state has had experience."
In the same publication, it advised the states that estimates made by
its actuaries indicated
"that if an unemployment compensation system for the entire
country had been set up in 1922 with 3 per cent payroll contribu-
tion, 50 per cent benefit payments for total unemployment, a wait-
ing period of four weeks within any year, and a maximum of twelve
weeks of standard benefits within any year, it would have remained
solvent and paid benefits in full until the end of 1933. . . . If a
waiting period of three weeks instead of four had been provided,
the maximum number of weekly benefits payable to an eligible em-
ployee within a year would have had to be reduced to eleven
weeks."
The states were told that all matters affecting the liberality of benefits
were within their control, but the plain implication of the Board's
advice was that the benefits should not exceed those which the actu-
aries estimated to be possible on the basis of employment data for the
years 1922 to .1933.11
Actually, the benefit provisions of most of the original unemploy-
ment compensation laws were somewhat more liberal than the recom-
mendations of the actuaries of the Social Security Board.4 Only two
states prescribed as long a waiting period as four weeks, but nearly all
states which fixed a two or three weeks' waiting period also provided
that an employee who became unemployed a second time within a
benefit year would be subject to a further waiting period. Instead of
the maximum duration of eleven or twelve weeks recommended by the
39. The extreme conservative character of these estimates resulted in large part from
the fact that the actuaries loaded their cost figures by 33Y3 percent, with the explanation
that such a margin of safety is necessary because in all forms of insurance there is a tendency
for the contingency insured against to increase. The soundness of this loading was ques-
tioned by the author at the time, but such was the dread of doing anything which the actu-
aries regarded as "actuarially unsound" that no one dared to advocate benefits as liberal as
their cost figures (without the artificial loading) indicated to be possible.
40. Detailed comparisons of the State Unemployment Compensation Laws have been
published by the Social Security Board from time to time. Comparative studies dealing with
many aspects of these laws have been made by the staff of the Social Security Board and have
been published either as publications of its Bureau of Employment Security or in the SocILa
SECURITY BULLETIN. Especially helpful are the Board's UNEMPLOYMENT CotrENSATION
ABSTRACTS: PROGRAM STATISTICS; PRovisIoNs OF STATE LAWS, 1937 TO 1944 (1944); Re-
ticker, Unemployment Compensation in the United States (1944) 49 INT. LAD. REV. 446, and
Reticker, State Unemployment Compensation Laws, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, July 1945,
p. 9.
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actuaries, most of the original unemployment compensation acts pro-
vided for a maximum of sixteen weeks, but on what is known as a
"variable durations" basis under which employees who have not
worked fairly steadily prior to unemployment exhaust their benefit
rights in a shorter period. Only six states had longer maximum dura-
tions than sixteen weeks, all of these on a variable durations basis, and
none of them had a maximum above twenty weeks. With few excep-
tions, the original laws provided for compensation on a 50 percent of
earnings basis. All the laws, however, also fixed maximum weekly
payments; the most common weekly maximum was $15, but many
states used a lower maximum and only two states a higher one. In a
majority of the laws no minimum weekly benefit rates were specified
and many states provided no compensation at all for partial unemploy-
ment.
No sooner had benefit payments begun than it became apparent that
these provisions were very inadequate. Even during the sharp depres-
sion of 1938 most of the states then paying benefits collected more
money currently from contributions than they paid out. Despite
rapidly improving employment in the years which followed, high per-
centages of the workers entitled to unemployment compensation bene-
fits exhausted their benefit rights before they found other work. While
it is clear from such limited data as is available that but few of the
recipients of unemployment compensation required supplementary
relief or had to go on the relief rolls as soon as their compensation pay-
ments ended, the compensation checks they received were so much less
than their prior earnings that they seemed totally inadequate.
The Social Security Board took the lead in pointing out the inade-
quacies of the benefits, almost from the time that benefits first became
payable. In the actual liberalization which occurred, however, there
was not much leadership. While the Social Security Board constantly
dwelt upon the inadequacy of the state laws, it leaned backward to
avoid giving the appearance of dictating to the states. Not until
January 1, 1943 did it address definite recommendations to the state
administrators for improvement of state laws. Not until shortly before
the legislative sessions of 1945 did it appeal to the governors (for the
first time since enactment of the original laws) to impress upon them
the need for prompt legislative action to correct existing inadequacies.
The Interstate Conference of Employment Security Administrators, 4'
41. This organization, originally kmown as the Interstate Conference of Unemploy-
ment Compensation Administrators, w.as organized by the Social Security Board and all
expenses involved in its annual (and sometimes more frequent) meetings and committee
meetings, together with those of the state administrators in attending these meetings have
been paid from the administrative funds xithin control of the Board. Almost from the be-
ginning, however, it has been a thorn in the flesh for the Board, serving as an agency to or-
ganize opposition to proposals for increased federal control.
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the organization of the state administrators, has at all times appeared
to be more interested in fighting federalization than in improving state
legislation. It has made recommendations for changes in the existing
laws only on a few matters of relatively minor importance. No com-
prehensive program for improvement of the state unemployment com-
pensation laws emanating from state sources was presented until imme-
diately prior to the legislative sessions of 1945, when the Council of
State Governments came forward with proposals.42 Nor has organized
labor ever developed such a program. While the state federations of
labor and the state industrial councils have kept an eye on unemploy-
ment compensation legislation in the states, the great labor federations
have taken the attitude that the only remedy lies in federal legislation
and have all but neglected the states.
Yet very considerable progress has been made in the liberalization
of the unemployment compensations laws and all of it through state
action. Some states have liberalized their unemployment compensa-
tion laws in every year since these laws were first enacted. Such liber-
alization was most extensive in the regular sessions of 1943 and 1945.
This year no less than twenty states increased both their weekly benefit
maximum and their maximum benefit duration and twelve more states
one or the other.43 Even before the 1945 legislative sessions, no state
had a waiting period longer than two weeks and nearly two-thirds of all
the states had waiting periods of but one week. At the present writing,
no state has a weekly benefit maximum of less than $15, while 27 states
(with 774 percent of all workers covered) have maximums of $20 or
more. The maximum benefit duration is now twenty weeks or more in
32 states (79 percent of all workers covered). Partial unemployment is
now compensated in all states. Considerable liberalization has also
resulted, in many states, from changes in the benefit rates and benefit
formulas.
Other Changes. Only brief note can be taken of other changes which
have been made in the less than nine years since the enactment of the
majority of the state laws.
Changes in coverage have been relatively slight. The so-called "un-
employment insurance tax" in the Social Security Act applies only to
employers of eight or more. Twenty-two states, however, from the
outset provided for broader coverage, and ten omitted all numerical
limitations. The number of states including employers of less than
eight employees has now risen to 29 and that of states without any
numerical limitations to sixteen. The increase in the total number of
employees covered has been much greater, thanks to the greatly in-
v' 42. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN TUE POST-
WAR PERIOD (1944).
43. On the 1945 amendments to the state unemployment compensation laws see Re-
ticker, State Unemployment Compensation Laws, SocIAL SECURITY BULLrTiN, July 1945, p. 9.
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creased industrial employment of wartime, rising from around 21 mil-
lion workers at the end of 1937 to 36 million in 1945.
Provisions governing eligibility for benefits have undergone far more
changes. These have mainly had the effect of restricting eligibility and
of denying benefits to some unemployed workers who would have
qualified under the original laws. Many states which had originally
had no such provisions in 1939 and 1941 included disqualifications for
voluntary leaving of work, discharge for misconduct or refusal of suit-
able work, either denying all unemployment compensation in such
contingencies or prescribing a much longer -waiting period for workers
unemployed for these reasons. At this writing, 27 states have all or
some of these disqualifications, and a study by the Social Securit,
Board of the effect of these provisions shows that, in five states, they
operated to disqualify from 2.8 to 10.2 percent of all claimants in 1943. 44
No similar study has been made of the effects of changes in the state
laws which have increased the requirements for eligibility to benefits in
terms of the minimum earnings prior to unemployment. These have
everywhere accompanied the adoption of uniform maximum durations
of benefits. Initially, uniform maximum durations of benefits were
provided in only one state law, while at the end of 1944 there were
fifteen laws with such provisions. Their effect has been to increase the
duration of benefits of employees who normally are regularly employed,
but also to exclude from any benefits workers who have had little or
only very irregular employment in covered employments.
At least one development (besides the slight extensions of coverage
which have been noted) has operated to give benefit rights to workers
not protected under the original unemployment compensation laws.
This relates to what has often been discussed as one of the outstanding
weaknesses of state administration-the failure to afford protection to
workers whose work takes them into more than one state or who move
from state to state. Initially, the state laws operated in 51 tightly
compartmented jurisdictions, with the result that migrant workers
were left, for all practical purposes, outside of the protection of unem-
kloyment compensation. The problem has not been completely solved,
but real progress has been made, and this has been the outstanding
accomplishment of the Interstate Conference of Employment Security
Agencies.45 Practically all states now have a uniform definition of em-
ployment under which the employees of a single employer who work in
more than one state are treated as if all their work were done in one
state. All states have subscribed to the Interstate Benefit Plan under
which workers entitled to benefits in any state can collect these benefits
44. Friedman and Wandell, Unmployment Compensation Goals in Ike Reconrrsiois
Period, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIn, Sept. 1944, p. 6.
45. Rector, Interslte BeJfit Procedures in Unemployment Compcnsalion,, Aumci;
Ecoxomnc SEcURgITY (Chamber of Commerce of USA), June 1944, p. S.
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wherever they may go within the United States and preserve their
rights when they accept employment outside of the state. Beyond this,
a considerable number of states have within the last two years adopted
the Interstate Plan for Combining Wage Credits and the Reciprocal
Coverage Arrangement under which credits for employment by several
employers and in different states are combined to give such employees
the same benefits as if all their employment had been within a single
state and for a single employer.
Changes relating to the financing of unemployment compensation
have been as extensive as those affecting benefits. From the outset, the
American laws differed from the British act in placing the burden of
financing almost exclusively upon the employers. This characteristic
has become even more pronounced, despite the fact that organized
labor, reversing its original position, now favors tri-party financing.
Ten states at one time provided for employee contributions and one
law for a government contribution. The last mentioned provision was
operative for only one year and today only four states have employee
contributions, and the total collections from employees in 1944 totaled
but 85 million dollars, contrasted with 1,100 million dollars collected
from employers.
Of greater consequence has been experience rating, which likewise
is a distinctive feature of the American laws. Whether employer con-
tribution rates should be uniform or varied in accordance with the
employer's experience was central in the controversy over pooled funds
versus employer reserves which preceded the enactment of the unem-
ployment compensation laws.46 It remained the major controversial
46. There never were employer reserves in the accounting meaning of that term under
any unemployment compensation law except for a small number of such reserves in Wis.
consin which existed for one year prior to the enactment of the Social Security Act. As has
been previously noted, the Huber bill in Wisconsin in the 1920's contemplated a pooled fund
with the employer contribution rates varying with their individual risks and unemployment
records. The Groves bill as introduced also proposed a single pooled state fund, in so far as
the collection and investment of the fund and the payment of benefits are concerned, but
provided for a separate employer account for each employer, which was credited with all
contributions paid by the employer and charged with all benefit payments made from the
state fund to his employees-the principal purpose of such individual employer accounts
being to determine the employer's future contribution rate. These provisions were retained
in the Wisconsin act of 1937, but, as has been recited, that act allowed employers to estab-
lish unemployment reserves of their own, instead of making contributions to the state fund.
Only a handful of employers ever took advantage of this provision of the Wisconsin law. In
an amendment to the Wisconsin law enacted in 1935 it was made clear that the moneys
credited to an employer's reserve account do not belong to him. Another Wisconsin amend-
ment adopted in 1937 created an equalizing account from which payments of benefits were
to be made to the employees of any employer whose employer account was exhausted-a
contingency which had not occurred up to that date. In actual operation the Wisconsin
state fund and the Wisconsin administration at all times have been practically the same as
those of states having pooled fund laws with experience rating provisions, although until
1945 it was entitled an "employer reserve fund" law. This applies also to all other employer
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issue until, in the last few years, the federalization of unemployment
compensation became a practical political possibility. It has, more-
over, pretty much determined the alignments on the federalization
issue and, despite the fact that experience rating now prevails in nearly
all of the states, is still hotly debated among the specialists in this field.
Experience rating was sanctioned in the provision of the Social Se-
curity Act allowing employers who had built up specified reserves, after
no less than three years of contributions, to credit as an offset against
the 3 percent tax levied in the Act not only their actual contributions to
state unemployment compensation funds but also the reductions in
contributions rates allowed them under state laws. Holding forth the
hope of reduced contribution rates in the course of time, this provision
led employers generally to support the inclusion of experience rating
provisions in the state laws. Organized labor as strongly opposed such
provisions, w ith the Social Security Board officially neutral but with
its staff generally supporting the position of organized labor. The out-
come of this conffict was that 40 of the 51 "states" included experience
rating provisions in their original laws, but among the eleven states
without such provisions were both New York and Pennsylvania. As
the time for putting the experience rating provisions into effect ap-
proached, a number of states either repealed or postponed the effective
date of these provisions. In the years 1938 to 1941, seven states took
such action while only five states which had not provided for experience
rating in their original laws did so during this period. Since then seven
states, including both New York and Pennsylvania, have provided for
experience rating, while no state has repealed such provisions. As
compared with 40 states with experience rating on December 31, 1937
and 38 on December 31, 1941, there are now 45 states, including all the
major industrial states, which make provision for experience rating.
These provisions, moreover, are now in actual operation in all of these
states, as against 17 states in which this was true at the end of 1941.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION .ND PROPOSALS
Federal Legislation Subsequent to the Social Security Act. There has
been much greater interest in proposals before Congress affecting un-
employment compensation than in the efforts to improve the existing
laws through state action. The results in legislation enacted, however,
have been much more meager.
The three most important acts passed by Congress during these ten
years have been the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensa-
reserve laws. "Pooled funds" and "employer reserves" as used in connection vith unem-
ployment compensation have been far more "fighting words" than dcscriptive terms. On
the other hand, there always has been and still is a very real difference between laws (whether
"pooled fund" or "employer reserve" laws) with e.xperience rating and tho-ze without such
provisions.
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tion Law, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and the Service-
men's Readjustment Act (often called the "G. I. Bill of Rights").
The District of Columbia law was passed soon after the Social Se-
curity At in 1935. 41 It differed from the original state laws in two
major respects: it provided for government contributions (along with
the usual employer contributions) and varied the benefits in accordance
with the number of dependents of the unemployed worker. Since its
enactment the only important changes in this law have been the repeal
of the provisions for government contributions, the inclusion of experi-
ence rating provisions, and some liberalization of benefits. Depend-
ent's allowances have remained a distinctive feature of the District of
Columbia law, which was not copied anywhere else until 1945 when
three states adopted similar provisions.
The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act 48 will be discussed
hereafter and the Servicemen's Readjustment Act is not primiarly an
unemployment insurance law. This 1944 law, however, does provide
for readjustment allowances which serve the same purpose as unem-
ployment compensation. These allowances will be paid to unemployed
veterans during the first two years after their discharge, and in a flat
amount of $20 per week for total unemployment and for maximum
periods of from 26 to 52 weeks, varying with the length of service. The
allowances are paid from the Treasury and are administered by the
Veterans' Administration but through the state unemployment com-
pensation services.
The amendments to the parts of the Social Security Act dealing with
unemployment compensation enacted by Congress since 1935 have all
been very minor. The most important has been an increase in the ap-
propriation for federal aid to pay the costs of state administration. In
the early years of unemployment compensation Congress several times
delayed passage of the appropriations acts including this item, with
resulting embarrassment to the states. This has not occurred in more
recent years, and the Congressional appropriations for this purpose
have always been ample. The only other changes in the provisions of
the Social Security Act which are of sufficient importance to be noted
in this article are those which were made by the Social Security Act
Amendments of 1939, the only major revision of the Act to date, which
included a number of changes in the coverage of the 3 percent tax (90
percent of which is offset by state contributions), the total effect of
which was some narrowing of coverage, and which exempted from this
tax the excess above $3,000 per year in the earnings of any employee.
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. The Social Security Act
exempted railroads from the federal 3 percent tax and most of the state
47. 49 STAT. 946 (1935), 46 D. C. CODE § 301 (1940).
48. 58 STAT. 284 (1944), 38 U. S. C. § 693 (Supp. 1945).
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laws included a like exemption, because it was expected that a separate
unemployment insurance system would be established for them. Work
on such an act was begun before the Social Security Act became law,
but it was not until 1938 that the Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act was passed by Congress.' 9 This was to all practical intents and
purposes an agreed-to measure, worked out by committees of the rail-
roads and the railroad labor unions under the guidance of Murray W.
Latimer, chairman of the Railroad Retirement Board. It set up a na-
tional unemployment insurance system for the employees of the rail-
roads, express companies, and sleeping-car companies, under the ad-
ministration of the Railroad Retirement Board. It provided for a uni-
form contribution rate from the carriers of 3 percent and a schedule of
benefits varying by wage classes and ranging from $1.75 to q3.00 per
day. A waiting period of seven days during any half month and a
maximum duration of benefits for 80 days in any, year were prescribed.
The total effect of these provisions was a benefit system considerably
less liberal than that provided under most of the state laws, although
more liberal to the lowest paid employees. In the first year of opera-
tion, benefits averaged only $18 for fifteen days of total unemployment,
and the total of the payments in that year amounted to only 26 percent
of the contributions collected.
A comprehensive revision of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act in 1940 11 liberalized very considerably the benefit provisions. The
waiting period was reduced to four days in a two weeks period, the
maximum benefit was increased to $4.00 per day, and the maximum
benefit duration to 100 days per year. With these amendments, the
Railroad Act ranks in liberality today somewhere near the average of
the state laws. Proposals to increase the benefits now pending in
Congress are supported by the railroad labor unions but opposed by
the railroads.
Unemployment Compensation for 1flarithinc Workers. ml maritime
activities were exempted from the tax provisions of the Social Security
Act as it was expected that Congress would soon set up a national un-
employment compensation system for maritime workers. Work on the
preparation of a bill to accomplish this purpose began soon thereafter.
After the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act became law in 1938,
the National Maritime Union launched a campaign for such legislation
and received some encouragement from President Roosevelt. In 1941,
a Seamen's Unemployment Insurance bill, ' supported by most of the
maritime labor unions and the Railroad Retirement Board, was ac-
corded hearings by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee of
49. 52 STAT. 1094 (1938), 45 U. S. C. § 351 (1940).
50. 54 STAT. 1094, 45 U. S. C. § 351 (1940).
51. H. R. 5446, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). See also Unemployment Compmsation for
Maritime Employees (1941) 41 COL. L. R~v. 1217.
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the House. The next year, Admiral Land, chairman of the Maritime
Commission, urged Congress to pass such legislation. But none of the
bills for unemployment compensation for maritime workers have ever
come to a vote in either house.
Because it was expected that a federal system would be established
and there was serious doubt whether the states had any authority to
include maritime workers in their unemployment compensation sys-
tems, nearly all of the states excluded these employees from their
original laws. Failure of Congress to act, and court decisions upholding
the right of the states to include at least some types 6f maritime work-
ers,52 have altered the situation to such an extent that nineteen states
now include all or some maritime workers within the scope of their
state acts." Proposals to bring all maritime workers within the scope
of the state laws are included in the Administration bills now pending
in Congress for supplementary federal unemployment compensation
benefits.
Proposals for Federal Standards, Reinsurance, and Tax Reduction.
Proposals for basic changes in the unemployment compensation provi-
sions of the Social Security Act which have not become law have at-
tracted far more attention than any legislation actually enacted affect-
ing unemployment compensation. These have centered about increased
federal control and participation in unemployment insurance. In the
first years after passage of the Social Security Act complete federaliza-
tion was not contemplated, but rather the establishment of uniform
federal standards and a national reinsurance fund. The earliest of such
proposals was made in 1939 in a report by the Special Senate Commit-
tee to Investigate Unemployment and Relief,54 popularly known as the
"Byrnes Committee," which urged that the Social Security Act be
amended to provide that no state unemployment compensation law
was to be recognized for tax offset purposes unless it met prescribed
minimum standards. A bill to carry out these recommendations was
promptly introduced by the committee chairman, Senator (now Secre-
tary of State) Byrnes." However, no further action was ever taken
upon it.
The next proposal for federal standards in unemployment compensa-
tion was the McCormack amendment to the bill which became the So-
cial Security Act amendments of 1939.6 This amendment represented
52. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943), aff'g Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Charlet, 134 F. (2d) 213 (1943); Matter of Cassaretakis, 289
N. Y. 119, 44 N. E. (2d) 391 (1942); Shore Fishery v. Board of Review, 127 N. J. L. 87,
21 A. (2d) 634 (1941).
53. For a good brief summary of the status of maritime workers under the state unern-
ployment compensation laws see Reticker, State Unemployment Compensation Laws, SociAL
SECURITY BULLETIN, July 1945, p. 23.
54. SEN. REP. No. 302, pt. 1, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
55. S. 2203, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
56. H. R. 5482, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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an attempt to combine tax reduction, popular with businessmen, with
federal standards, desired by organized labor. It proposed minimum
standards to which the state laws would have to conform, similar to
those recommended by the Byrnes Committee. Along with such stand-
ards it authorized the states to reduce the contribution rates to their
unemployment funds whenever they had been built up to one and one-
half times the total contributions collected in the best year or to this
percentage of the total benefits paid out in the worst year, whichever
was the higher. The amendment passed the House on recommendation
of the Ways and Means Committee, but was killed in the Senate after
both organized labor and the Social Security Board expressed opposi-
tion to the tax reduction feature.
In the nex-t session, the McCormack amendment (with some changes)
became the McCormack bill, 5 which was introduced at the request of
the American Federation of Labor. Not to be outdone, the Congress of
Industrial Organizations came forward with the Murray billf 3 differ-
ing only in details from the McCormack bill. Both bills prescribed
benefit standards somewhat more liberal than the predecessor pro-
posals;" both drastically restricted experience rating and provided for a
reinsurance fund to be established by the national government to serve
as a source to which the states might turn to pay benefits in depressions
when their state funds became exhausted. Neither bill came to a
hearing, however, and these proposals are of interest principally as
representing organized labor's program at this time for improving un-
employment compensation.
During the next year and a half, immediately prior to Pearl Harbor,
new proposals for increased federal control were put for-ard and the
battle lines on this issue were more tightly drawNm, but there was little
publicity about what was happening and no action at all in Congress.
In this period, the Social Security Board in its official statements rec-
ommended only federal standards and a national reinsurance system.
Within the Board there was serious discussion of a program under
which minimum federal standards would be combined with an overall
reduction in 3 percent tax on employers of eight or more. The Ameri-
can Association for Social Security publicly urged such a program,
taking the position that a 2 percent contribution rate was ample."
During this period also, the Bigge plan (named after its author, Pro-
57. H. R. 7762, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
58. S. 3365, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
59. The McCormack bill prescribed that the state laws must provide for a waiting
period of not more than one week, a minimum benefit of $6 per week, a maximum benefit of
at least $24, and a uniform maximum benefit duration of 24 weeks per year. The Murray
Bill prescribed the same standards with the difference that its minimum benefit xs $7 par
week, and the maximum benefit $25.
60. N. Y. Sun, Oct. 14, 1940, p. 20, col. 2.
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fessor George E. Bigge, a member of the Social Security Board) made
its appearance aid was the most widely discussed proposal at the
time.61 This contemplated a reduction in the tax offset to a maximum
of 2 percent, making the federal tax actually collected 1 percent, in-
stead of 0.3 percent. In return, the national government was to pay
75 percent of all benefits exceeding those which the states could finance
with 2 percent contribution rates. Neither this proposal nor any other
emanating from Washington was acceptable to the state administra-
tors. A permanent lobby, privately financed but working in close con-
junction with the state administrations, was set up, which most un-
compromisingly fought all proposals for changes in existing provisions
of the Social Security Act relating to unemployment compensation.
Under these conditions, the people who had championed federal mini-
mum standards gradually came to the conclusion that complete feder-
alization of unemployment insurance was the only solution.
Wartime Changes and Proposals. The first definite recommendation
for the federalization of unemployment compensation by any agency
of the national government was made, shortly before Pearl Harbor, by
the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management 12 which
advocated the federalization of both the public employment offices and
the administration of unemployment compensation. The first of these
recommendations was carried out almost immediately after the Axis
made its attack upon the United States. The President, in a telegram
to all governors, requested them to turn over to the national govern-
ment the state public employment offices, with an explicit statement to
the effect that the states would retain the administration of unemploy-
ment compensation. This request was complied with by all states, but
by many of them only with a statement by their governors that they
interpreted the President's telegram as including a promise that the
public employment offices would be returned to the states at the end of
the war. Such a promise has since been spelled out very definitely sev-
eral times by Congress, most recently in the annual appropriation to
the Social Security Board for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1945. So
it came to pass that throughout the war period the public employment
offices have been operated by the national government, while unem-
ployment compensation has remained with the states.
In his budget message of January 7, 1942, President Roosevelt rec-
ommended "liberalization and expansion of unemployment compensa-
tion in a uniform national system." It was expected that this would be
followed by an Administration proposal either for the federalization of
61. First presented in Bigge, Some Unsolved Problems in Connection with Unemployment
Compensation in CONFERENCE OF EmPLOYMENT SEcURITY AGENCIES OF NEW YORK, PENN-
SYLVANA, NEW JERSEY, AND DELAWARE (Hershey, Pa., Feb. 14, 1941) 4.
62. See Federalization of Employment Service Proposed, EcONO111c SECuRiTY BULLETIN
(National Ass'n of Manufacturers), Oct. 1941, p. 8.
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unemployment insurance or for uniform federal standards for unem-
ployment compensation. Instead, the President recommended passage
of a bill appropriating 300 million dollars for supplementary unemploy-
ment compensation to workers temporarily unemployed during the
conversion of American industry to war production. 3 This proposal
was premised upon an expected large volume of unemployment, the in-
adequacy of the benefits under state laws, and a fear of the exhaustion
of many state funds. Extended hearings were held by the House Ways
and Means Committee, but the bill was never reported. Unemploy-
ment during the conversion period was much smaller than expected
and the state funds did not have to pay out in benefits even as much as
they were currently collecting from contributions.
Thereafter, throughout the war period, unemployment was at the
lowest levels ever attained. There was little interest in unemployment
compensation and no occasion for concern about the adequacy of the
state funds. By this time, organized labor, the Social Security Board,
and many top officials in the national government were openly advo-
cating federalization, but only as a postwar measure so that it received
scant attention while we were at war.
Federalization as Part of a Unified Social Insurance Systcn. In the
last years of the war, the federalization of unemployment compensa-
tion was advocated, not as an independent measure, but as one feature
of a unified and enlarged social security program. It was first presented
in this light in the report of the National Resources Planning Board on
Security, Work, and Relief Policies,4 published in March 1943, of which
Dr. Eveline M. Burns and Dr. William Haber were the principal au-
thors. This report was not followed up by any bills in Congress, but
some months later the (first) Xagner-Murray-Dingell bill 61 was intro-
duced. While it presented a comprehensive social security program,
its two most discussed features were a national health program and a
national unemployment compensation system to replace the existing
federal-state system. This national system would' have all-inclusive
employee coverage, with uniform benefits throughout the country, but
varying with earnings and the number of dependents, with $30 per
week as the maximum benefit and 26 weeks as the maximum duration.
63. The Administration's program was first presented to Congrezs in two bills, H. R.
6465 and H. R. 6466, by Congressman Cannon, Chairman of the Appropriations Com-
mittee. These were soon replaced by H. R. 6559, introduced by Chairman Doughton of the
Ways and Mleans Committee. It was upon this last bill that e.atended hearings were con-
ducted by the Ways and leans Committee.
64. This report was published in two documents: a long report by the Committee on
Long Range Work and Relief Policies of the National Resources Planning Board on Srcir-
mTY, 1x, x,,AN RELIEF POLICIEs, and a summary of this long report, with an introduc-
tion by the NRPB, which President Roosevelt transmitted to Congress, which beam the
title PosT-WAN PLANNNG.
65. S. 1161, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. (1943).
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Outside of Congress, this bill was widely discussed and often referred to
as an Administration measure, but it was never endorsed by President
Roosevelt, never came to a hearing in either house, and died with the
adjournment of the 78th Congress.
It was not until several months after the 79th Congress convened in
its present First Session that the second Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill 01
made its appearance. Although the bill differs in quite a few respects
from its predecessor, few changes were made in the unemployment
insurance provisions. Like the first bill, it provides for the federaliza-
tion of unemployment compensation and the retention of the public
employment offices by the national government. To date, no hearings
have been held, but the alignments on the measure are already quite
clear. It is actively supported by organized labor and the Social Se-
curity Board, and opposed by the Interstate Conference of Employ-
ment Security Agencies and the Council of American State Govern-
ments. There have been reports that President Truman will endorse
the bill, but, to date, he has not done so.
Unemployment Compensation for Veterans and War Workers. In
Congress, major attention has been given not to the Wagner-Murray-
Dingell bill but to proposals designed to meet the situation of an ex-
pected large volume of unemployment during the transition from a
wartime to a peacetime economy. This problem first received real at-
tention in Congress in the summer of 1944. One aspect was dealt with
in the Servicemen's Readjustment Act,67 previously noted. More com-
prehensively, the problem was considered in connection with demobili-
zation legislation. Two rival bills were considered in the Senate: the
Kilgore bill and the George bill.68 The former provided, in effect, for
the federalization of unemployment compensation, with more liberal
benefits than are paid under any state law. The latter left unemploy-
ment compensation with the states, but made provisions for unem-
ployment compensation for federal employees to be financed by the
national governmefit although paid through the state unemployment
compensation services. While the Kilgore bill, despite a favorable
report by the Military Affairs Committee, never came to a vote, the
George bill passed both houses. In the House, however, the provisions
for unemployment compensation for federal employees were elimi-
nated. As passed, its only provision relating to unemployment com-
pensation was one for loans from the Treasury to any state whose
unemployment compensation fund might approach exhaustion during
the reconversion period-an unlikely contingency.
Several months before the end of the war, President Truman in a
66. S. 1050, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
67. 58 STAT. 284 (1944), 38 U. S. C. § 693 (Supp. 1945).
68. The George bill was S. 1767; the KIlgore bill was S. 1893, and a substitute therefor,
the.Kilgore-Murray-Truman bill was S. 2061 (all 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1944).
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special message recommended legislation for supplementary federal
unemployment compensation during the period of reconversion. Not
until nearly two months later was any bill introduced to carry out these
recommendations. In July two bills having this objective made their
appearance, the Doughton bill in the House and the Kilgore bill in the
Senate. 9 While differing in some respects, both bills propose that in
any state which enters into an agreement with the Director of War
Mobilization and Reconversion the national government will pay until
June 30, 1947, through the state unemployment compensation agency,
supplementary unemployment compensation to increase the maximum
payments to eligible workers to $25 per week and the maximum dura-
tion to 26 weeks and also to include within the scope of benefits all
workers otherwise eligible now excluded from coverage, including mari-
time workers. Under these bills also, the national government ,ill pay
unemployment compensation to its civilian employees whose jobs are
terminated, subject to the same conditions as apply to private employ-
ers in the state where employed, and will pay up to S200 transportation
costs to displaced war workers.
Hearings on these bills were begun in both houses during the last
week in August. On September 6, the President in his reconversion
message urged immediate passage of this proposed legislation and
postponement of the return of the public employment offices to the
states until reconversion is completed. The Senate responded by pass-
ing the Kilgore bill on September 20, with amendments providing for
deletion of the provisions for the increase of the maximum payments
to $25 per week and for return of the public employment offices to the
states within 90 days. By this time, no action has been taken on the
Doughton bill and what the House will finally do with the President's
recommendations appeared still very uncertain.
CONCLUDING OBSErVATIONS
A survey of the legislative developments such as is presented in this
article can only inadequately measure the progress which has been
made in unemployment compensation in the United States. "The
proof of the pudding is the eating." When the test of the results in
actual operation is applied, a strong case can be made for the thesis
that unemployment compensation has proven a disappointment.
Proof in support of this thesis is afforded by the small benefit pay-
ments. In the ten years since passage of the Social Security Act, above
9 billion dollars have been collected in taxes (contributions) for un-
employment compensation purposes but less than 2J billion dollars
has been paid out in benefits. Despite all of the liberalization of
benefits, the average benefit for total unemployment now being paid
69. H. R. 3736 and S. 1274, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945).
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is only $18 per week. Even in the prosperous war years, large percent-
ages of all unemployment compensation beneficiaries have exhausted
their benefit rights before finding employment. As recently as 1941,
above 50 percent of all claimants were in this plight in no less than
nineteen states. Nearly a third of all workers in this country, more-
over, are entirely outside the protection of the unemployment compen-
sation laws.
Looked at historically, however, this record appears better. Instead
of benefits limited to twelve weeks at the maximum, after a four weeks
waiting period, as the Social Security Board originally suggested on
the basis of the forecasts of its actuaries, most states now have maxi-
mum benefit durations of twenty weeks and maximum benefits of $20
per week or more, with a one week waiting period. These are as liberal
as the standards which the champions of uniform federal standards
sought to impose upon the states in the period prior to our participation
in the war. The average benefits paid have increased even more. As
late as 1940, the average benefit for total unemployment was but $10.56
per week, while today it is $18. This is not a munificent amount, but
much greater than the average of the payments to the recipients in any
of the public assistance programs or to the primary beneficiaries in the
federal old-age insurance system. While disbursements totaling 214
billion dollars in the six or seven years that most states have paid un-
employment compensation benefits are small compared with the con-
tributions collected, this figure triples the total of all payments made
to date in the old-age and survivors' insurance system. And the present
total reserve of 7 billion dollars is much larger than anyone dared hope
might be accumulated in preparation for the next depression.
These results are mainly attributable to the full employment which
has prevailed during the war. Except for the year 1938, when most of
the states began benefit payments, unemployment declined steadily
until it reached a modem low in the last years of the war. Under such
conditions unemployment compensation was not put to much of a test.
We are now in the postwar period, in which this country faces new
conditions and new problems. While it is to be hoped that reconversion
unemployment will be of short duration, there is every reason to expect
unemployment compensation to be much more important in postwar
America than it was during the war. Under the new conditions we now
face, there is danger in looking backward rather than forward. Nothing
is to be gained by name calling or the rehashing of issues which have
little present significance; for, while unemployment compensation has
had an interesting history in this country and one which records real
progress after difficult beginnings, it is not an institution which has at-
tained final form. How it will develop is likely to depend upon its
functioning in this period of its first real test.
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